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IN T·HE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
1

Appellant s
Briel

CHARLES YONK,

Deceased.

STATEMENT

OF

FACTS

This ·is an appeal by the administrator from a decree of partial distribution by which the court decreed
distribution of $26,000 on a per stirpes or representative basis, as prayed for by cross petitioners, and not
equally on a per capita basis, as prayed for by the administrator.
None of the facts is in dispute.

The administrator,

William F. Kidman filed his amended, verified petition
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2
praying for partial distribution of the above estate on a
per capita basis, to-wit:

the sum of $1,083.33 to each

of the 24 nieces and nephews of decedent.

Some of the

heirs, to-wit: Garland Y onk Alfred Y onk, Edith Nessen,
Merlin J. Cowley, Norma C. Wilson and Hanna Bensen,
through their attorney Newel G. Daines, filed their crosspetition praying for distribution of said estate on a per
stirpes or representative basis,

to-wit:

the

sum

of

$5,200.00 to Garland W. Yonk, as the only child and heir
of Henry Y onk, a predeceased brother of decedent; $2,600.00 each to Merlin J. Cowley and Norma C. Wilson, as
the children of Elizabeth Yonk Cowley,
sister

a

predeceased

ot <lecedent; $1,733.33 to each of the three children

of William F. Y onk, a predeceased brother of decedent ;
the sum of $7 42.85. to each of the seven children of Fred
C. Yonk, a predeceased brother of decedent; and the sum
of $4 72.72 to each of the eleven children of Minnie Yonk
Kidman, a predeceased sister -of decedent.
It is alleged and admitted by all parties concerned
that decedent Charles Yonk died interstate; that he was
never married, and left no issue, father, mother, brother
or sister, but left 24 nieces and nephews surviving him.
It is also alleged and admitted that appellant is the duly
appointed, qualified and acting administrator in said esstate; that more than four months have elapsed since
publication of notice to creditors.

That all claims, fun-

eral expenses, etc., and some of the charges and expen-
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ses of probate have been paid; that the first annual account has been filed and approved by the court, and that
it is for the best interest of all of the heirs that partial
distribution of $26,000 be made at this time. That such
distribution will still leave ample funds in the estate to
pay the balance of all expenses, inheritance taxes, etc.,
when the same are determined.
It is also admitted and alleged both by the administrator and the cross petitioners that decedent left surviving him as his heirs at law 24 nieces and nephews,
children of deceased brothers and sisters, as follows:
One child of Henry A. Yonk, a predeceased brother
of decedent.
Two children of Elizabeth Yonk Cowley, a

prede-

ecased sister of decedent.
Three children of William F. Yonk, a predeceased
brother of de~edent.
Seven children of Fred C. Yonk, predeceased brother of decedent.
Eleven children of Minnie Yonk Kidman, a predeceased sister of decedent.
It will thus be seen that the heirs at law of decedent are all in the same degree of kindred and consanguinity to the decedent, they are all next of kin, nieces
and nephews, in equal degree of relationship to the de-
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cedent.
The one question presented on this appeal relates to
the amount of the estate to which each heir is entitled.
Should distribution of this estate he made equally on a
per capita basis, or should it be made on a per stirpes,
representative, basis to the 24 nieces and nephews?
ASSIGNMENT· OF ERROR
Appellant assigns as error to the court below its
decree of partial distribution distributing the estate on
a representative basis rather than on a per capita basis,
as prayed for by the administrator.
Appellant contends that the heirs, being all in the
same degree of kindred to decedent, are entitled to share
said estate equally.

That the court should have distri-

buted $1,083.33 to each of the said heirs.

Under our

present statute as it now stands there is no direct provision for the heirs herein under conditions and facts as
here presented; but we submit that before the amendment by the Code Commission in 1933, our succession
statute was clear and definite, as to the rights of these
heirs.

The amendment _to Section 101-4-5 (6) has made

·that statute indefinite, uncertain, ambiguous and has led
to utmost confusion.
Subsections ( 4) and (6) of Section. 101-4-5 of our
statute are the principal sections involved in determining the rights of succession to the estate of decedent's
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nieces and nephe\Ys herein.
Respondents' council argued to the court below, and
the court upheld, that distribution to the heirs in case at
bar must now be made under subsection ( 4).
that as the first error to the court below.

We cite

It is our con-

tention that subsection ( 4) does not apply and was not
intended to apply unless brothers and sisters or some of
them survive the decedent.
brothers and sisters inherit.

Spbsection ( 4) states when
The premise or condition

which allows subsection ( 4) to operate and

ap~ly

has eli-

minated all nearer relatives than brothers

or

sister:::;,

and thus provides when brothers and sisters

inher~t.

The fact that subsection ( 4) also says "and to the children or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister
by right of representation" does not do away with the
necessity that a brother or sister must survive the decedent in order for that subsection ( 4) to apply.
We direct the court's attention to the earlier compilations, this statute: Section 2828 Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1907; and Section 6408, Compiled Laws of Utah>
1917.

T'ho~e

earlier compilations contain sub-headings

for each of the nine sub-paragraphs.

While in Section

101-4-5, 1933, these sub-headings have all been dropped,
the numbering, wording and subject matter of each of
the nine sub-sections is the same as in the earlier compilations, and hence we submit the same meaning was
and is clearly intended in each sub-division of the present
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statute.
Thus, subsection (1) of 101-4-5, in both the present
and earlier compilations covers succession in the normal
cases where there is suhviving husband or

wife

w"ith

children or issue; subsection (2) covers the cases where
there is issue, but no surviving husband or wife; subsection (3) "Surviving husband or wife, no

issue,

when

father, etc., inherit"; subsection ( 4) "When brothers and
sisters iJ?.herit all"; subsection (5) "when

husband

or

wife inherits all"; subsection (6), "No immediate family, next of kin inherit"; subsection (7) "Death of child
under age, other children

succeed" ;

subsection

( 8)

"Death of child under age, when issue of other

chil-

dren succeed"; subsection (9) "When estate escheats to
school fund."
Thus by the ordinary process of elimination we submit that subsection ( 4) states a case when

all

closer

relatives have been eliminated and when brothers and
sisters inherit.

In order to inherit they must be alive.

The fact that said subsection ( 4) says if any (implying
some but not all) are dead that their share goes by representation to the children or grandchildren (of the
dead brother or sister), does not change the

rule that

some brothers or sisters must be alive in order for subsection ( 4) to apply.
Our Section 101-4-5 ( 4) is identical

with

former

provision of Section 1386 (3) Calif. Civil Code, and the
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California Supreme Cou~t has interpreted that section
and held that it does not apply unless brothers or sisters
survive the intestate.
In the ease,-Estate of Nigro, 156 P. 1019, the California court held that Section 1386 (3), (our subsection
101-4-5 (4)) applied only when a brother or sister survived the intestate.

Again in a later case, In re Ross'

Estate, 202 P.

where grand-nieces

641,

and grand-

nephews claimed to take under Section 1386 (3), our subsection ( 4), the California Supreme Court again reaffirmed the holding in the Nigro case that said section
did not apply unless som2 brothers or sisters survived
decedent.

t_

Other courts have similarly interpreted· such· statu-

tory provisions.

In Appeal of Hall 102 A. 977, (Maine),

the statute provided that when intestate left no wife, issue or parents, the estate goes to the brothers and sisters and if any be dead by representation to the children
of such brother or sister.

The Main court held that that

statute did not apply unless brothers or sisters survived
the intestate.
Counsel for contestants concede that such was the
rule prior to 1933.

In their written brief to the court

below they stated :
"Prior to 1933 we concede that the rule would
have been otherwise. Under the act before amended by the legislature in 1933, the Court will note that
collateral heirs after brothers and sisters were
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treated as next of kin, (subsection 6), and that subsection ( 4) only applied where there was a surviving
brother or sister."
Then counsel proceeded to argue in their brief that
by the amendment to subsection ( 6), adding the phrase,
"nor children or grandchildren of any deceased brother
or sister," that children and grandchildren of deceased
brothers and sisters have been excluded from inheriting
under sU.bsection (6) and therefore, without any statute
to that effect, they must now be held to take under subsection ( 4), irrespective of whether or not any brothers
or sisters survived the intestate.

In their brief to tnt

court below they stated :
"As our legislature by its am~ndment in 1933,
thus excluded the children or grandchildren of any
deceased brother or sister of a decedent from in.heriting under the provisions of subsection 6, as
next of kin, the only possible sub-section that they
· can inherit under is sub-section 4 ... "
We think counsel's conclusion

(which

apparently

the lower court accepted) was erroneous and unsound,
for (1) they have pres.ented no change or amendment to
subsection (4) which would make that subsection apply
now when it did not apply before 1933; and (2) no valid
reason was shown or presented supporting the

unjust

conclusion that the heirs at law herein should now be
held to be excluded under subsection (6), as next of kin,
and therefore be excluded from taking equally under
(6) now, as they admittedly did before the purported
amendment.
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We submit both of these arguments, e. g. (1) that
the heirs herein, all nieces and nephews, do not inherit
equally under (6), but now take by representation under
(4), even though no brother or sister survived the decedent; and (2), that these heirs have now been excluded from taking under (6) as next of kin, (as they admittedly did take prior to 1933) were and are both erroneous, and led to the unjust and erroneous decree of distribution herein appealed from.
First it should be noted that the amendments or
changes i~ subsections (4) and (6) were not __ made __ by
the legislature, but were made by the Code Committee
for the codification of our statutes.

The only change

made in (4) was as stated, to add the words "or grandchildren." We have no grandchildren of brothers or
sisters involved in case at bar.

We submit .the addi-

tion of the words "or grandchildren" in

(4)

did not

change the operation and effect of ( 4) and did not indicate, and cannot be construed to indicate an intent that
(4) should now apply when it did not apply before, e. g.
when no brother or sister survived the intestate.
Where the provisions of a statute are carried
forward and embodied in a section of a revision or
codification, in the same words, or in words which
are substantially the same and not different in
meaning, the latter provision will be considered a
continuance of the old law and not as a new and
original enactment, and this is so both where there
is an express declaration to that effect in the codi-.
fication or revision, and in the absence of such de-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
claration; and the mere fact that acts are incorporated into a revision of the statutes, and the sections
given new .numbers by the revisers, does not change
the force or effect of the acts. Nor does a reenactment of a chapter without the title change or enlarge the scope of the law in the absence of an indicated intent to alter the scope of the enactment.59 c. J. 897.
.
It is therefore appellant's contention that the heirs
herein, nieces and nephews of decedent, when no brother
or sister survives, do not take under subsection (4) now,
any more than they did prior to 1933. We have shown
from the statute itself, from other court's interpretation of similar statutes, and from respondent's counsel's
own admission, that (4) did not apply prior to 1933,
when decedent left him surviving no brothers or sisters.· Thus we think the court's first error was in its
apparent holding that the heirs in case at bar now take
under (4).
2. We submit that the second error, was the lower
court's apparent conclusion and ruling (as per counsel's
argument) that the purported change or amendment to
subsection (6) in 1933, excluded the heirs herein from
inheriting or taking equally as next of kin under (6), as
they admittedly did prior to 1933.

And along with that

conclusion, (excluding them from taking under ( 6) and
in order not to disinherit such heirs, nieces and nephews,
entirely-where no brothers or sisters survive the decedent, hold, without any statute to that effect, that such
heirs must now be held to take by representation under
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(4) and not equally under (6) as they did prior to 1933;
That subsection ( --1) must now be held to apply in such
cases although admittedly that subsection did not apply
prior to 1933.
Prior to 1933, subsection (6), Sec. 6408 (6) Compiled
Laws of Utah 1917, read as follows:
If the decedent leave neither issue, husband,
wife, father, mother, brother, nor sister, the estate
must go to the next of kin in equal degree ...
Section 101-4-5 (6) now reads:
If the decedent leave neither issue, husband,
wife, father, mother, brother, nor sister, nor children or grandchildren of any deceased brother or
sister, the estate must go to the next of kin in equal
degree, ...
It will thus be seen that the only change was to add the
words "nor children or grandchildren of any deceased
brother or sister" following the ·word "sister."
the meaning and effect of (6)

What is

when ~thus · amended'!

What \vas the purpose and intent of the change in (6)?
Has that purpose been accomplished?
In ascertaining the meaning of a code revision resort may be had to reports of the code commissioners.
.

.

50 AM. JUR. p 469, 59 C. J. 1102, section 651. In reponse to our letter to the Secretary of State, as to what
his records show by way of report by· the Code Commissioners concerning changes in the statute (Section 1014-5) here considered, the Secretary states in his letter
of August 17, 1948 as follows:
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Upon check a copy of the report of the Code
Committee for the proposed revision of the Utah
Statutes, 1933, we quote the following concerning
Section 101-4-5 referred to in your letter:
"Sections 101-4-5 (3), ( 4), (5) ,- (6), have been changed
to satisfy the recommendation of the Bar reader,
following amendments made by the California Legislature to meet an injustice resulting froiQ the
decisions of its courts under a statute identical with
ours. The effect accomplished is to keep succession
in the direct line down through grandchildren."
The "injustice resulting from the decision of the
California courts'' referred to in the Code Committee's
report were, without doubt, the Nigro case, supra, where
decedent left no brothers or sisters, but left children and
grandchildren of deceased brothers and sisters, and in Re
Ross' Estate, supra, where decedent left no brothers or
sisters, but left children,

grandchildren,

and

great-

grandchildren of predeceased brothers and sisters.

In

both of which cases, as J.Ve have already noted, the Californit Supreme Court held that the

California

Civil

Code Section 1386 (3) (Utah Subsection (4) did not apply, when no brother or sisters survived the intestate.
The California court further held in each of said cases
that the estate passed under Section 1386

(5)

(Utah

subsection 6) to the next of kin equally and thus held, in
each of said cases, that the- estate went to the nieces and
nephews equally, as next of kin,

to the exclusion of

grandchildren and great-grandchildren of other predeceased brothers and sisters.
3.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that such
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a result was an ''injustice", was it remedied by the
amendment or changes made by the Code Committee
in (4) or (6) in 1933?

We think not.

The above report of the Code Committee states, or
at least strongly infers, that the changes made or proposed in the Utah Statute were the-saine as the amendments already made by the California Legislature, for
they say, "following amendments made by the California Legislature."

That was an easy phrase to throw in,

which undoubtedly tended to lull our Legislature into
acquiescence to the proposed change without a careful
check. But that was not true. The i:hange made in
the California statute is far different from the change
in the Utah statute. The court wlil recall that prior to
1933 the Utah statute, subsections (4) and (6) were
identical with California Civil Code Sections 1386 (3)
and {5) respectively.

We have already noted that the

only change made in the Utah statute, subsection ( 4), in
1933, was to add the two words "or grandchildren'' in
(4) following the word "children." Whereas, the same
section in the California Civil Code, Section 1386 (3) was
entirely rewritten, and is now known as

Section

225,

California Probate Code, and reads as follows:
No surviving spouse nor issue. If the decedent
leaves neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to his
parents in equal shares, or if either is dead to the
survivor, or if both are dead in equal shares to his
brothers and sisters and to the descendants of deceased brothers and sisters by right of representa-
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tion.

(Enacted 1931.)

Thus Section 225, Cal. Probate Code, now grants or directs," . . . in equal shares to his brothers and sisters
and to the descendants of deceased brothers and sisters
by right of representation." Thus by the present California statute, the grant under ( 4) is direct to the des<:endants of brothers or sisters of intestate, just as much
as it is to brothers and sisters; it is not to the brothers
and sisters of decedent and then, if any be dead, to the
descendants of any deceased brother or sister by representation.

The condition precedent does not now apply

to bring in the necessity of brothers or sisters surviving
decedent in order for that section ( 4) to apply.

Hence

the court's prior construction of the earlier section,
California 1386 (3), (Utah 4), (that said section does
not apply unless brothers and/ or sisters survive decedent) would, we think, not now be held to apply to section 225 of the present California Probate

Code.

At

least the California legislature has made a definite effort to avoid that prior interpretation of ( 4), which the
Code Committee did not do.

Likewise California Civil

Code section 1386 (5), (Utah subsection 6), was amended to read as follows:
If the decedent leaves neither issue, spouse,
parent, brother, sister, nor descendant of a deceased brother or sister, the estate goes to the next of
kin in equal degree ... (Enacted 1931.)
Thus it is submitted that California has now quite clear-
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ly provided by amendments to ( 4) and (6) that descendants of brothers and sisters, no matter how remote, take
before next of kin, and such descendants are no longer
classified as next of kin, but as collateral heirs, designated to take by representation. But the change made in
the Utah state (4) & (6) is not similarly clear. We submit the change made in our state has caused confusion
and uncertainty, as well as injustice. Did the change
made by the Code Committee in (4) and (6) remedy the
"injustice" mentioned by the Code qommittee, resulting
from the California decisions ? We say "No." As we
have noted in the California case, In re

Ross'

Estate,

supra, nieces and nephews were permitted to take the
entire estate as the next of kin, and grandnieces, grandnephews,

great-grandnieces

were excluded.

and

great-grandnephews

This the Code Committee called "injus-

tice", but what rights are given to this

third

great-grandnieces and great-grandnephews,

class-

under

the

amendments as made by the Code Committee, in 1933?
The answer none!
Did the Committee then remedy

the

"injustice"

which they pointed to as their reason for the change?
If we are now to change

to

a

representative

basis, we submit the "injustice" has not
died, but that is has been aggravated.

been

reme-

The court, in the

Ross case, excluded both grandnieces and great-grandnieces and gave the entire estate to the nieces and
nephews equally as the next of kin. Under our statute,
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as the Code Committee amended it, great-grandnieces
and great-grandnephews are still excluded, even accepting respondent's interpretation that (4) now automatically applies. . If it is an "injus1tice" to give the estate
equally to the next of kin, (after brothers and sisters)
can it be justice to allow grandnieces and grandnephews
to participate by representation and at the same time
exclude great-grandnieces and great-grandnephews from
taking by representation, when they represent another
brother or sister of intestate?
If the statute is not going to grant the

estate

equally to the next of kin, after brothers and sisters, as
our statute clearly did prior to 1933, (and we think still
does) , why, under the pretence of remedying an "inj ustice" and a particular decision of the

court,

provide

that grandnephews may inherit but that great-grandnephews (from another brother or sister) are still to be
excluded?

Particularly when that was part of the "in-

justice" ruling in the case (Ross case) complained of?
Again, suppose that the intestate had three predeceased brothers, and that one had left children, the second had left only grandchildren, and that the third had
left only great-grandchildren.

Under present. subsection

( 4) and/or (6), as contestants must argue, the surviving
grewt-grandchildren of the third

predeceased

brother

would be excluded from any part of the inheritance, this
because children and grandchildren of the first two pre-
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deceased brothers survived the

intestate.

The

great-

grandchildren (representing the third brother) could not
share under subsection ( 4) for, even if the court should
now hold that ( 4) applies where no brothers or sisters
survive, that subsection is limited to brothers ar d sisters,
and their children and grandchildren.

Thus the grand-

children of the second pre-deceased brother would share
in the estate under the terms of subsection ( 4), if it is
to be interpreted in accordance with the contention of
contestants,.-(that (4) applies even though no brother
or sister survives). They would take the representative
share of the second brother, even though there were
nieces and nephews, one degree closer to the intestate,
who by the normal rules, and our construction of sub-section (6), would be entitled to his estate.

The chil-

dren of the first brother would, af course, be entitled to
share in the estate, but only by right of representation,
to 1/3rd of his estate.

By statute, 101-4-23, they would

now "Take the same share or right in the estate of another person that their parents would have taken if living." Thus the children_of the first brother would take
1/3 of the estate; the grand-children

of

the

second

brother would take 1/3 of the estate; but the greatgrandchildren of the third brother would be

excluded,

even though they are representative stock of the third
brother.

Who would take the share which would have

gone to the third brother had he been alive ? The court
would be unable, under the statute as it now exists, to
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distribute l/3 of the decedent's estate, and

the

same

would probably escheat to the State. for no one of the
heirs, would be entitled to claim it.

If two brothers had

left only great-grandchildren, then 2/3rds of the estate
would escheat to the State, even though the intestate
had left nieces and nephews from the first brother.
4.

It is at once apparent how unjust, ambiguous,

uncertain and useless is the phrase

"nor children or

grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister inserted
in subsection (6). It not only fails to remed·y the "injustice" noted by the Code Committee, but it aggravates
that injustice, for while it grants (if this court rules
that (4) automatically applies now) part of the estate
by representation to grandnieces and grandnephews, at
the expense of nieces and nephews, it at the same time
denied inheritance by representation (or at all) to greatgrandnieces and great-grandnephews, and

makes

the

share which would otherwise have gone to them by representation, escheat to the State,-all at the expense of
nieces and nephews who would otherwise inherit that
part of the estate as next of kin, under the definite and
clear provision of our statute prior to 1933.

It is a well

settled rule of construction that the courts will avoid a
construction which disinherits heirs who would otherwise
take, and cause part of the estate to escheat to the State.
We think it is clear that all the Code Committee did
was to insert the same phrase

"chil~ren

or grandchildren
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of any deceased brother or sister" in subsection (3), ( 4),
(5) and (6).
thing.

They seemed to figure that settled every-

But did it?

and ( 4) read:

~·

Prior to the change, subsections (3)

... and to the children of any deceased

brother or sister by right of representation."

In subsec-

tion (5) the wife inherited all, prior to 1933, if there
were no brothers or sisters, but under (5), as amended
by the Code Committee in 1933, the phrase "no children
or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister" "\vas
inserted following the word "sister".

Suppose decedent

left no nieces or grandnieces, but left gre·at-grandnieces
or great-grandnephews?

Why are they arbitrarily ex-

cluded under ( 5) when representation is now brought in
for the first time in that section?

Is that justice?

As we have stated in (4) the only change was to
add "or grandchildren" following the word "children'' in
(4).

So that the phrase now

read~

"and to the children

or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister by
right of representation."

Now that whole phrase was

lifted over, by the Code Committee, and instered in (6),
except that it is prefixed by the

neg~tive

word "nor."

5. It must be kept in mind that subsection (4) had
been definitely construed and interpreted to aP.ply only
if and when a brother or sister survived, and that the

Code Committee had that in mind, for they refer to those
very decisions, so construing ( 4).

But they made no

change in ( 4) which would make it apply irrespective of
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whether or not a brother or sister survived, as did California.

We have pointed out that the small change in

( 4) (adding "or grandchildren") would still leave the
same interpretation of that section (4)

where it had

been fixed by the courts,-to apply only if a brother or
sister survived.

In other words the condition precedent

in ( 4), for children or grandchildren to· inherit and take
by representation, is that a brother or sister must survive
the decedent.

That condition precedent therefore still

stands in (4).

No change was made to overcome that

interpretation of ( 4).
It is a rule of construction of revised statutes and
codes, that if a section thereof has been codified from a
judicial decision, it is to be construed in the light from
the source from which it was taken.

50 A.M. JUR. Pg.

469.

Then what was accomplished in (6) by inserting the
negative phrase "nor children or

grandchi~dren

of any

de~

ceased brother or sister? It will be noted that this
negative phase in (6) throws t}lese people "children or
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister" into the
large class of nearer relatives \vho are supposed in (6)
to be

alre~dy

taken care of in the :r;rior subsections, and

so ( 6) proceeds to grant succession, after them, to the
next of kin.

But the only sections which make it pos-

sible for them to take anything at all are sections (3),
(4) and (5); and the only section which in any way ap-
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plies to case at bar is ( -1:).

As we have seen, children

and/or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister,
have been taken care of in ( 4), if a ·brother or sister survived the decedent, but not otherwise.
How are these children or grandchildren taken care
of if no brother or sister survived the decedent?
subsection ( 4), as it now stands; and not by

Not by

~ubsection

(6), as it now stands, for that subsection expressly excludes them.

There is no other section of our succession

statute which takes care of nieces and nephews.

T'here-

fore if that negative clause in (6) is given literal effect,
nqt only confusion, but a hiatus has been created in our
statute, so far as children and grandchildren of predeceased brothers and sisters are concerned, where no
brother or sister survives the decedent.

Thus, instead

of taking care of grandnieces and grandnephews, by apparently allowing them to take by representation along
with nieces and nephews_ subsection (6), as amended by
the Code Committee, hJls in fact expressly excluded both,
-·grandnieces and grandnephews, as well as nieces and
nephews, when no brother or sister survives the intestate.
So now, as the statute has been amended to read, literally, nieces and nephews can claim neither by representation, nor as next of kin, if no brother or sister survives
the intestate.
If the intent of the

~mendment

was, as

the

Code

Committee implies in its report, to keep succession in di-
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rect line down through grandchildren (but not to include
all decendants of brothers and sisters), why didn't they
either: (1), rewrite (4_), as did the California legislature,
so as to overcome the interpretation given (4)
courts and make ( 4) apply irrespective of

by the

whether a

brother or sister survived, and grant succession directly
nQ.t only to brothers and sisters but also to their children
and grandchildren?

Or, (2), make subsection (6) oper-

ate and apply as a direct grant of succession to children
or grandchildren of deceased brothers and sisters, and
not as an exclusion of them?
amended to read:

Thus if

(6)

had

been

"If decedent leave neither issue, wife,

father, mother, brother nor sister, then the estate must
go to the children and grandchildren of deceased brothers
and sisters by right of represe:Qtation, and thereafter to
the next of kin in equal

degree."

This

would

more

nearly have accomplished their avowed purpose, though
even so, such a wording would still be subj e~t to criticism, because of the injustice to great-grandnephews,
and also the possibility of escheat to the State in the case
of surviving great-grandnieces and great-grandnephews,
which we have set forth above.

This injustice and pos-

. sibility of escheat to the State, was avoid_ed in California,
where the amendment grants

succe~sion

direct to broth-

ers and sisters and to their descendants.
The prior judicial construction of (4) becomes, we
submit, of controling importance. In 50 AM. JUR. Pg.
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312,

s~.

321:

"As an aid in the construction of a statute, it is
to be assumed or presumed that the legislature was
acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction of former statutes on the subject and that
the statute was enacted with the light of judicial
construction that the prior enactment had received.''
From this it follows that ( 4) must be given

the

meaning which the California Courts had given it,-that
(4) applies only if a brother or sister survives the intestate.
It is apparent that the har reade:c and the code committee accepted the interpretation of ( 4) given by the
California Supreme Court,. for they acknowledgeq that
the amendments were made to do away with the "injustice" of the interpretation given that section by the California court.

But instead of intelligently rewriting the

statute so as to change the rule, (as did the California
legislature) the Code Committee merely inserted the
negative phrase "nor children or gr9-ndchildren of any
deceased brother or sister" into (6) and thus created an
ambuguity, and made (6) meaningless.

For since the

identical words were again used, they must be given the
same interpretation by the courts.

These words in ( 4)

meant, and had been construed to mean, that children or
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister did not
take by representation unless a brother or sister of the
deceased survived.

Now in (6) those words must be
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held to mean the same thing: i. e. that next of kin in
equal degree do not inherit equally, but take by repre!
sentation, when and only when they

are children or

grandchildren of any deceased brother

or

sister

and

where there is a brother or sister surviving.
The negative phrase "nor children or grandchildren
of any deceased brother or sister" in ( 6) then ,becomes
ambiguous and meaningless, for by its terms (condition
precedent) these heirs do not take under ( 6).

Likewise

they do not take under (4) unless a brother or sister
survive.

In view of the confusion a:-:d

amtiguity

of

said phrase in (6), we submit it should be disregarded
by the court and section ( 6) held to stand as it did prior
to 1933, unamended.
Contestants are furthermore faced with a dilemma.
Either they must argue that ( 4) applies regardless of
whether or not a brother or sister survives, which would
be against the clear provisions of that statute prior to
1933, against their own admission, and against repeated
interpretations by various courts; and they must also
then admit that there was no "injustice" which the Legislature should attempt to remedy in 1933, in which case
they would also have to admit that the change made to
( 6) was meaningless, because the heirs would take under
(4) and not under (6) in any event.

Or they must con-

fess, if they concede that said phrase in ( 4) only applied
when a brother or sister survived, that the same phrase
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likewise only applies in (6) today when a brother or sister survives, which is equally ambiguous and absurd
for by its terms (6) does not apply if a brother or sister
survives.

We hope counsel '"ill clear up, if they can, the

the confusion, ambiguity, uncertainty,

injustice,

and

possibility of escheat, which is now packed into (6).
6.

We further point out that the change made in

the statute in 1933 was a change by the qode Commission, and that a change so made is not entitled to the
same weight as a legislative enactment, and will not be
regarded as altering the law where the statute as revised
is ambiguous.

Duncan v. Idaho County (Idaho, 1926)

245 P. 90, where the Idaho court said: ...
"in the case of Libby v. Pelham, 166 P. 565, 30 Idaho
this court said that changes made by a revision
statute, as distinguished from

legislative

will not be regarded as altering the law,

of

a

enactment,

unless

it

is

clear such was the intention; and, if the statute as revised is

ambiguou~,

reference may

be

had

to

prior

statutes."
Conflict between original act and code or revision. Where there is a conflict between an ac"t as it
was passed by the legislature and as it appears in
a code or revision, the act as originally passed will
control. 59 C. J. page 1102.
7.

We therefore respectfully submit that until the

pres.ent uncertainty,

ambigui~y,

and possibility

of

es-

cheat in (6), is cleared up by the legislature, this court
should disregard the negative phrase "nor children or
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grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister," inserted into (6) by the Code Committee.
For the sake of argument, we may concede that the
apparent purpose of inserting that negative phrase in
(6), was to take nieces and nephews out of their former
classification as next of kin, to whom our statute grants
succession equally, on a per capita basis,
them as collateral heirs.
this is not enough.

and classify

But appellant contends that

There must be a corresponding

grant of succession of estate t9 them as such collateral
heirs, otherwise there is a hiatus in the statute.

Mere-

ly changing their classification is not sufficient.
It is not enough to say that now that nieces and
.nephews have been pushed out of (6) they must be deemed to take under ( 4).

For, as we have shown, (4) had

been interpreted and construed to

apply only when

brothers or sisters survived, and (4) was not changed or
amended so as to make it apply, irrespective whether or
not brothers or sisters survived.

Hence the heirs here-

in, who took under (6) equally, prior to 1933, cannot now
be held to take by representation under ( 4).
Again we say that said negative phrase in (6) should
be disregarded and ignored because of its confusion and
uncertainty, and the heirs herein should be held to take
equally as next of kin under (6).
8.

This is in accordance with the general rule as to

kindred of equal and unequal degree laid down in 26 C.
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J.S. 1029:
Except \vhere part of the members of that class
are deceased, and taking by right of representation
is permitted, kindred of the degree nearest to the
intestate succeed to the estate, to the exclusion of
those of more distant degrees; and, both by express statutory provision and otherwise, where the
next of kin of the intestate who are entitled to share
in the estate are in equal deg-ree to the deceased,
they share equally in his estate.
The Editors of C. J. S. here cite many

cases,

in-

cluding Kincaid v. Cronin, 22 N. E. 2d 576 (Ohio), where
the Ohio court said:
The rule of equality will be enforced in all cases to the class of those in the nearest degree of consanguinity to the intestate.
and Johns v. Scobie, 86 P. 2d 820, 121 A.

L.

R.

1404,

where the California court held that when the intestate's
heirs were all nephe\vs and nieces they were all entitled
to equal shares, under the la\v of succession, and therefore took title to the estate as tenants in common upon
the death of the intestate .
. Again in 26 C. J. S. 1029 the general rule as to representation and taking. per stirpes or per capita is stated
as follows:
Where the persons entitled to the estate are in
unequal degrees of consanguinity to the intestate,
the more remote take per stirpes; but where all are
in equal degrees in consanguinity, they take per
capita.
16 Am Jur. 806, lays down a similar principle:
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Descendants, whether lineal or collateral of
equal degree of kin to decedent take per capita and
not per stirpes.
Nieces and Nephews, sec. 35b, of 26 C.J.S. 1040:
In cases where brothers and sisters are entitled
to inherit, the children of a deceased brother or sister are entitled to take their parent's share; and,
where no brothers and sis~ers sJ}rvive, nephews· and
nieces take as the next of kin ....
9.

Wherever the principle

-ol r~prese~tation is ap-

plied in our statute, 101-4-5, the general rule is adhered
to:

that the persons· entitled to take the estate share

equally if they are in equal degree, and take by right of
representation only where they are in unequal degree ..
Thus, in subsection (1) : "remainder In equal
shares to his children, and to the issue of any deceased
child by right Qf representation."
Again in _subsection ( 1) :

"If all the descendants

are in the same degree of kindred to the decedent, they
share equally, otherwise they take by right of representation."
In subsection (2):

''the

estate

goes

In

equal

shares to the children living, or to the child living and
the issue of the deceas.e.d child or children by right of
representation."
In subsection (3) :

"in equal shares to the brothers

and sisters of the decedent, and to the children or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister by right of
representation."
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In subsection ( 4):

bro.~h:~rs~

"in equal shares to the

and sisters of the decedent, and to the children

o~

gra,nd-

children of any deceased brother or sister by rig~t

o~

r~presentation." ·

In subsection (6) :

"the estate must go to the next

of kin in equal shares."
In subsection (7):

"in equal shares to the other

children of the same parent, an.d to the issue

of any

such other children who are dead, by right of representation."
In subsection (8) :

"lf all the issue

are

In

the

same degree of kindred to the child (Uncle), they
share
..
: "
'

;

-

the estate equally, otherwise they take by right of rep·
-

resentation."

'

(This section we submit as

-

J

,

pr~ctically

controlling, in case at bar, to show the intent of the legislature and the meaning of our statute as a whole.)
In not a

sing~e

instance is the p;rincipl.e of ;rep;rese;n-

tation applied by any act or grant of

s~ccessiop

statute, when all the heirs are in equc;tl deg;ree of
to the decedent.

Only when t:here is an

in o:u:r
~jndre«;;

UJl.J~q:tJal :r:eJ(,lt~on

is the representative principle applied; aAd

t\1~~ .i~ tr.~e

in the case of collateral heirs as well as in the cas;e of
>

-.

•

£

lineal descendants.
10.

There can be no question that where an am-

biguity or uncertainty has been created, rules of statutary construction give the Court, nay, make it impera-
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tive and a matter of the court's duty, to interpret the
statute fairly and according to its prior plain meaning,
and to give effect to the

gen~~al

rules and principles of

law gleaned from a reading of our statute as a
The

~Court

should not

be~caught

whole.

upon a literal snag of an

ambiguous negative phraseology inserted apart from its
setting, meaning and the context of the entire statute.
11.

Three cases were cited by contestants to . the
.

court below, in support of their position.
tinguishable from case at bar.

~

All are dis-

The first, in re Swenson's

Estate, 160 N. W. 253, (Minn.), is different both as to
the facts and the law.

All of the heirs were not of equal

degree, as a niece had died leaving children surviving her
and . rep:r:esenting her share.

Thus the primary reason

for making equal distribution, because the heirs are all
of equal degree, did n9t exist in that case.

The Minne-

sota statute was also very different from the Utah statute.

To all lineal descendants the representative prin-

ciple was there strictly applied regardless of
they were in equal degree or not.

whether

The Utah statute says

they shall share equally if they be in _equal degree.

The

representative principle by the Minnesota statute was
applied to all the "lawful issue of any brother or sister."
Subsection (4) of the Utah statute applies it only to
"children or grandchildren of any deceased-.. brother or
sister."

Thus it is apparent at once that the intent and

purpose of the Minnesota Legislature was to force all
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lineal and collateral heirs to take by right of representation whether they were of equal degree or not.
have pointed out the Utah statute

As we

in every instance,

where the representative principle is applied, says that
if the heirs be of equal degree they share equally, other-

wise they take by right of representation.

We do not

believe the negative phrase inserted in (6) has overcome
this.
In the second case, cited by contestants, Appeal of
Messler, 127 A. 85, (N.J.) the statute was amended to
expressly provide that children of deceased brothers and
sisters should

tak~

by right of representation, thus:

... "Then equally

among

the parents . and

brothers and sisters, and the representatives of deceased brothers and sisters ; provided that

no

representation shall be admitted among collaterals
after deceased brothers'

and

sisters'

children."

The Utah statute has no such provision.
The third case, Hous.eley v. Laster, (Tenn.) 140 S.W.
2d 146, was based on a similarly clear statute:

"If no

father or mother, or brothers and sisters, or the children
if such brothers and sisters representing them, equally."

Contestants would have a more plausible case if the Utah
statute read as does the New Jersey or Tennessee statute.
But the Utah statute reads different.

The construe-
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tion contended for by respondents, -distribution to the
heirs herein by representation rather than per capita, is,
we S!Jhmit, not supported by our statute,
whole.

10-4·-5,

as a

Nor can they claim such distribution (by repre-

sentation) under any specific section of our statute.
The fact that the Code Committee attempted to classify
them, (niece§ and nephews), as collateral heirs

rather

than as next of kin, is, we repeat, not sufficient, where
no corresponding grant of succession is provided by statute.
In addition to the foregoing, we wish to point out
that in said three cases cited by respondent to the Court
below as having changed the rule of -successi0.11 from per
capita to the representative principle, succession to estate
was in each case, correspondingly granted by the statute
to the heirs in their new status and classification, to-wit:
to collateral heirs. to take by representation, from their
prior status as next of kin, who took equally on a per
capita basis._ Thus in each of said three cases the statute had reclassified nieces

and nephews from

status as next of kin to that of

collater~l

their

heirs, and the

statutes, in each case, as the courts point out, was clear
..

.

....

and unequivocal not only as to classification, but also as
to gran,t of succession of estate on a representative basis
rather than on a per capita basis.
In the case Re Swanson's

Estate,

the Minnesota
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court recognized the rule

that

where

the

statutory

amendment was ambiguous and the legislative intent uncertain, and not clear, that the court would disregard the
purported amendment and would carry out
statute, as was urged in that case.

the

prior

But the Minnesota

court said:
In the present case the law as revised is clear
and unambiguous, and manifests a plain intent which
will not permit us to hold that the Legislature intended to continue the former statute by
which a surviving father took the whole estate to
the entire exclusion of a surviving mother. Neither
is there any rule which will permit us to disregard
the new clause which the L.egislature inserted in
subdivision 5 of the present Statute. The insertion
of this clause leaves the statute clear and unambiguous, and under such circumstances we cannot reject
this clause nor declare it meaningless, but must give
it the effect which the Legislature plainly intended.
(Judgment affirmed")
We have pointed out that just the opposite is true
of the Utah Statute (6).

By

inserting

the negative

phrase "nor children or grandchildren of any deceased
brother or sister," in (6) neices and nephews have been
excluded from (6), and by failing to amend (4) so as to
make that section apply, whether or not a brother or
sister survives intestate, the heirs herein have literally
been excluded as heirs of the intestate.
Such a result could not have been intended by the
legislature.

Neither can it be argued that it was intend-

ed to change from next of kin

to

the representative
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principle where, as here, all of the heirs are nieces and
nephews in equal degree of consanguinity to intestate.
Hence we come back to our main ·contention, that the
confusion and uncertainty

created· by the purported

amendment to (6) compels the court to ignore it, and
distribute the estate under {6), with the negative phrase
deleted, which will thus distribute the estate herein to
the heirs (all nieces and nephews) equally.
Deletion of Statute . . . However there are
cases in which words of a statute are so meaningless, or inconsistent with the intention of the legislature otherwise plainly expressed in the statute,
that they may be rejected as surplusage and omitted, eliminated or disregarded. 50 Am. Jur. Pg. 219.
Extent and limitation of adherence to Foreign Construction, 50 Am. Jur. pg. 473.
The presumption and general rule th~t . the
adoption of a foreign statute carries with it the
prior construction in the originating state is regarded as of special force, and strong, persuasive, and
is entitled to great weight, and respectful consideration, so that only strong reason will warrant a departure from it.
Construction of Foreign Courts
It is a general rule of law, in statutory construction, that it is proper to resort to the decisions
of courts of other states, construing statutory language which is identical or of similar import. 50
Am. J ur. pg. 315. (This applies particularly in the
construction of ( 4).
Indefiniteness and Uncertainty
In the enactment of statutes reasonable precision is required. Indeed, one of the prime requisites of any statute is certainty, and legislative
enactments may be declared by the courts to be in-
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operative and void for uncertainty in the meaning
thereof. This power may be exercised where the
statute is so incomplete, or so irreconcilably conflicting, or so vague or indefinite, that the statute
cannot be executed and the court is unable, by the
application of known and accepted rules of construction to determine what the legislature intended with any reasonable degree of certainty. 50 Am.
J ur. Sec. 4 72, pg. 484.
Ambiguity.

The courts regard an

ambiguity

to

exist where the legislature has enacted two or more provisions which appear to be inconsistent.

There is also

authority for the rule that uncertainty as to the meaning
of a statute, may arise from_ th~e fact that giving a literal interpretation to the words that would lead to such
unreasonable, unjust and impracticable or absurd consequences, as to compel a conviction that they could not
have been intended by the legislature.
In conclusion, we submit that the construction contended for by the administrator, and

the

which follows fr_om such construction, is
equitable and just.

distribution
much

The estate herein came

more

from

an

uncle to the heirs.

It did not come from any brother or

sister of intestate.

Neither did any part of this estate

ever pass to any predeceased brother or sister of decedent.

At no time did they have any power or control

over any part of this estate.
The heirs herein are all nieces and nephews.

They

are all equally related in the same degree of consanguinity to decedent; who apparently had no favorites, for he
left no will.

These njeces an nephews were apparently
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all equally near and dear to the intestate;

and

in as

much as they were all equally related to him, we respectfully submit, not only from the law and the

statutes

which we have argued (and the analogy to be drawn
from sub-sections (1) and (8), but also as a matter of
justice and equity and fair play, this estate should be
distributed to the heirs herein equally, as his next of kin.
More controlling still is the fact that (6),
amended by the Code Committee,

makes

the

as now
statute

vague, ambiguous and accomplishes such unjust results
by penalizing· the heirs of. decedent who come from large
families, but who are equally related to intestate, that
this court should refuse to accept the interpretation contended for by respondents.
50 Am.. Jur. page 372.

E. Avoidance of

Undesir-

able Consequences.
No. 368. Generally. The results which will
follow one construction or another of a statute is often a potent factor in its interpretation. Frequently, the undesirable or mischievous consequences of a
different construction are used by the courts to indicate the correctness of the interpretation adopted
by them by the application o:f_ other rules of construction. Similarly, courts sometimes take the
time and space to refute the undesirable consequence
claimed to attach to a statute under an interpretation of it favored by the courts. Indeed, there are
cases in which the consequences of a particular
construction are, in and of themselves conclusive as
to the correct solution of the question. In any
event, it is generally regarded as permissable to consider the consequences of a proposed interpretation
of a statute, where the act is ambiguous in terms
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and fairly susceptible of two constructions. Where
the language of a statute is doubtful and the necessity for construction arises, the court may consider
whether the legislature could have intended a construction that would be highly injurious, rather
than one beneficial and harmless . . .
Where the literal construction of an act will
produce results so extraordinary that they cannot
be deemed to have been within the legislative intent, the general language of the act may be restricted so as to accomplish the general intent and purpose of the act. In this respect, there is authority
for the rule that uncertainty as to the meaning of a
statute may arise from the fact that giving a literal interpretation to the words would lead to such
undesirable consequences as to compel a conviction
that they could not have been intended by the legislature.
369. Inequitable Results. The law is presumed to be equitable, and it is a reasonable and
safe rule of construction to resolve any ambiguity
in a statute in favor of an equitable operation of the
law. However, where the statute is una111biguous,
the consideration whether the provisions of the statute are strictly equitable or otherwise, should not
influence the court in determining the effect thereof. The courts may not give to a statute a meaning
to which its language is not susceptible, merely to
avoid what the court believes are inequitable results.
The fact that the effect of the statute as applied to
a particular case may be inequitable does not make
it absurd so as to justify a departure from its plain
meaning.
370. Injustice or Unfairness. In the constructiop. of a statute, consideration of what causes
injustice may have potent influence. It is not to be
supposed that the framers of a statute contemplated
a violation of rules of natural justice, and it should
not be presumed to have been within the legislative
intent to enact a law having an unjust result. To
the contrary, it is to be presumed that the legisla-
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ture intended the law not to work an injustice. Accordingly, it is a general rule that where a statute
is ambiguous in terms and fairly susceptible of two
constructons, the injustice which may follow one
construction or the other may properly he considered, and the courts, to support their construction of
a statute, frequently refer to the justice thereof, or
to the injustice which would result from a different
construction of the law. Indeed, it is the duty of
courts to render such an interpretation of the laws
as will best subserve the ends of justice, in so far
as this may be accomplished in accordance with well
established rules of statutory construction, and it is
considered a reasonable and safe rule of construction to resolve any ambiguity in a statute in favor
of a just or fair interpretation thereof, or in favor
of such an interpretation as would promote and effectuate justice, and result in a fair application of
the statute. A construction should be avoided which
renders the statute unfair or unjust in its operation,
where the language of the statute does not compel
such a result. The terms employed by the legislature are not to receive an)nterpretation which conflicts with acknowledged principles of justice if another sense, consonant with those principles, can be
giv~n to them.
Moreover, the fact that unjust results follow the literal application of the language
of a statute justifies a search of the statute for
further indications of _legislative intent. On the
ground that a techincality should not be permitted
to override justice, the general intention of the legislature is generally held to control the strict Jetter
of the statute where an adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice.
Respectfully submitted,
LEON F'ONNE:SBECK,
Attorney For Appellant
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